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Free Trade, Ethics, and Information: Reconciling International Trade 









Increasing  globalization  and  free  trade  agreements  have  generated  a  number  of 
controversies. One significant issue is the potential conflict between free trade and ethical 
standards.  While free  trade  in  theory  need  not be  antithetical  to ethical  standards,  as 
defined in practice by major trade organizations free trade conflicts with national ethical 
standards for issues such as labor standards, environmental impact, and animal welfare. 
The concerns of trade organizations on this issue have some merit. However, the one-
sided  position  of  trade  organizations  is  both  flawed  and  politically  unsustainable.  A 
balance must be achieved between legitimate ethical issues and minimizing trade barriers. 
Guidelines or principles are presented for how trade organizations can balance legitimate 
ethical issues against free trade considerations. In addition, it is argued that the provision 
of information valued by consumers should be allowed as a matter of general principle. In 
fact,  the  rather  than  information  provision  being  a  trade  barrier,  the  prohibition  of 
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Increasing  globalization  and  free  trade  agreements  have  generated  a  number  of 
controversies. One significant issue is the potential conflict between free trade and ethical 
standards. This issue has received some attention, though the extent of the discussion has 
been very limited relative to other concerns about trade policy. While free trade in theory 
need  not  be  antithetical  to  ethical  standards,  as  defined  in  practice  by  major  trade 
organizations free trade conflicts with national ethical standards for issues such as labor 
standards, environmental impact, and animal welfare. 
The  objective  of  this  paper  is  to  reconcile  free  trade  objectives  with  ethical 
considerations.  The  sources  of  conflict  and  its  relevance  are  described,  followed  by 
suggestions for possible solutions.  Solutions include a set of guidelines for reconciling 
ethics and trade, as well as advocating a general rule in favor of the provision of full 
information. 
The Problem: Why Ethical Standards and Free Trade Conflict 
Conflict  arises  between  nations’  desire  to  regulate  their  own  markets  and  trade 
organization rules when countries attempt to implement ethical standards or ethically-
relevant labeling and these ethical standards are not related to the observable attributes of 
the final product. How something is produced matters for a variety of ethical reasons. It 
matters for the environment (e.g. pollutants, carbon emissions, and habitat destruction), 
for labor standards (e.g. child labor laws, wage levels, abuses of worker rights), animal 
welfare  issues  (e.g.  tuna  bycatch  of  marine  mammals,  minimum  space  standards  in 
animal agriculture, agricultural practices deemed cruel), as well as other ethical issues. 
While free trade in theory need not be antithetical to ethical standards, as defined in 
practice by major trade organizations free trade conflicts with national ethical standards 
for  issues  such  as  labor  standards,  environmental  impact,  and  animal  welfare.  Trade 
organizations such as WTO, NAFTA, and GATT explicitly state that only final product 
attributes are relevant and production process is irrelevant. According to  WTO rules, 
even labeling for process and production method information is not legitimate unless it is 
related to product safety (Hobbs, et al., 2002). 
There have been some discussions relevant to this topic including Hobbs et al (2002), 
which discusses animal welfare regulations in relation to the WTO, and Gasiford et al 
(2001) which discusses the role of product attributes that are ethical rather than utilitarian 
in nature and notes that they have become more important lately. However, in general the 
discussion of the conflict between ethics and trade has been very limited relative to the 
amount  of  attention  paid  to  numerous  other  concerns  economists  have  expressed 
regarding trade policy. In fact, it appears likely that many economists in the area of trade 
policy have never given serious thought to this issue. 
Generally, trade organizations have held that production process is irrelevant and cannot 
be a basis for regulation if the final product remains unaffected. Economists in general 
frequently appear to also implicitly assume that production processes are irrelevant if 
they do not affect the tangible attributes of the final product. Although most economists International Conference on Globalization and Its Discontents, Cortland, 2007 
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do not explicitly state that production process factors are not part of the relevant attributes 
of a good, the assumption is often implicitly made by exclusion when economists state 
what dimensions of a good are relevant. For example, when describing what qualities 
affect  consumer  demand  for  food  products,  Caswell  and  Mojduszka  (1996)  describe 
product quality as “a bundle of characteristics (attributes) that determine the product’s 
performance”.  The  authors  draw  their  approach  from  a  text  on  consumer  demand 
(Lancaster, 1971). When discussing the validity of the contingent valuation methodology, 
multiple arguments are made in Hausman (1993) that ethical dimensions of value should 
be excluded from total value. But ethical dimensions of value do exist, and do affect 
demand even if they are not visible in the final product. Frank (2005) argued that ethical 
issues  in  the  production  process  are  valid  attributes  for  consumer  consideration  even 
when final products are identical. If economists follow the principle “De gustibus non est 
disputandum”, then these attributes are relevant because consumers place value on them. 
Even  if  an  attribute  does  not  affect  a  good’s  performance,  it  is  relevant  as  long  as 
consumers care about it. The key test for whether an attribute is relevant is whether it 
would  affect  demand  in  a  perfect  information  environment.  For  example,  Teisl  et  al 
(2002) found “dolphin safe” tuna labels to be relevant to consumers, even though the 
product itself would be indistinguishable without the label. Yet despite the relevance of 
the dolphin safe label to consumers, it has nevertheless been ruled to be a “trade barrier”. 
Although the “dolphin-safe” attribute of the good cannot be observed without labeling or 
outside knowledge and though it does not affect the good’s performance, it is embedded 
in the good in the sense that it is associated with the process required to create and bring 
the good to market. 
Embedded ethical attributes are much more common in goods than generally realized 
(Frank, 2005). For any good in which at least some consumers change buying behavior 
based on ethics, the market price of that good is at least partially ethically determined. 
Consumers boycott brands based on where they advertise, company dealings with certain 
other  firms,  union  contracts  or  labor  practices,  environmental  practices,  testing  of 
products on animals, country of origin, and countless other reasons. It is not unreasonable 
to say that the prices of the majority of goods contain an embedded ethical dimension. 
People in the United States have been shown repeatedly in surveys to care about ethical 
factors in good purchases that may not be apparent in final products. A 1991 study by the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) concluded that American consumers consider 
the  environmental  consequences  of  their  purchase  decisions  (EPA,  1991)  while  USA 
Today poll found that 57 percent of people said they would pay 15 percent more for 
groceries package in recyclable material, and 52 percent of people said they had stopped 
buying from companies that they believed were polluting the environment (USA Today, 
1990). RoperASW conducted a poll that found 33 percent of the population bases their 
spending in part on environmental values. A survey by the Natural Marketing Institute 
found that about 33 percent of the population takes environmental and social issues into 
account when making purchases (Cortese, 2003). In a 1983 survey, 15 percent of people 
said  they  had  boycotted  a  company  or  product  because  they  were  believed  to  harm International Conference on Globalization and Its Discontents, Cortland, 2007 
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animals (DDB Needlam, 1983). In a Gallup poll, 62% of people said that there should be 
strict laws passed regarding the treatment of farm animals (Moore, 2003). 
There are clearly some valid reasons for allowing nations to regulate trade based on their 
ethical norms. Even economists associated with a laissez faire perspective acknowledge 
importance of public ethical standards. For example, Milton Friedman is well-known to 
have argued that firms should only focus on maximizing shareholder value. But in order 
to  do  so  and  maintain  some  ethical  standards  within  a  nation,  Friedman  argued  that 
ethical constraints must come from societal rules and consumer choices. 
So if there are to be any ethics, society must be able to control market constraints. 
Virtually all economists acknowledge that ethics outside of market forces have at least 
some place in society. This in turn implies that nations must have some legal control over 
ethical rules and standards. 
At the same time, the concerns of trade organizations on this issue have some merit. A 
country could create a law ostensibly based on a moral principle as a method to limit 
foreign competition. Trade barriers can easily be created and legitimized under a facade 
of  ethics.  Strict  labor  policy  or  wage  standards  could  exclude  all  developing  world 
imports. For example, if the United States decided that it will only allow goods into the 
country produced by workers making at least $6/hour on average, it could position such a 
law as a moral issue based on labor standards while effectively eliminating competition 
from the developing world. Trade organizations do have a legitimate concern that ethics-
based  regulations  do  not  get  abused  in  order  to  intentionally  create  trade  barriers. 
However, the  one-sided position  of  trade  organizations  is  both  flawed  and  politically 
unsustainable.  A  balance  must  be  achieved  between  legitimate  ethical  issues  and 
minimizing trade barriers. 
How to Balance Ethical Considerations and Free-Trade 
A set of guidelines or principles are needed  for how trade organizations can balance 
legitimate ethical issues against free trade considerations. The goal here is to create a set 
of preliminary guidelines as a starting point for further discussion and analysis. It is likely 
that trade organizations themselves will be responsible for judiciously weighing these 
competing factors. But this is not a new role for them. Just as trade organizations have 
taken the judicial role of “finders of fact” regarding, for example, whether genetically 
modified foods are a legitimate health concern, trade organizations must make more of an 
effort to judiciously balance ethical issues against free trade considerations. 
There are probably many who would be skeptical of trade organizations’ ability to fairly 
balance  these  competing  interests.  The  institutional  structure  of  trade  organizations 
arguably works against an equitable consideration of these issues. It is possible that an 
alternative organizational structure is necessary to address these topics. For example, an 
independent judicial process could be created with membership partially controlled by 
NGO advocacy groups on the ethical issues in question. The optimal organization of the International Conference on Globalization and Its Discontents, Cortland, 2007 
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judicial process is beyond the scope of this paper. However, some such process appears 
to be necessary to balance trade vs. ethical interests just as it is with a number of other 
issues where multiple valid goals at times conflict. 
The control mechanisms that nations use regarding enforcing ethical principals can be 
divided  into  two  basic  categories:  (1)  Laws/Regulations,  and  (2)  Consumer  ethical 
preferences. In the case of laws/regulations, in order to have an effective ethical control 
mechanism, countries must be able to establish laws that make sure goods and services 
sold  in  their  country  conform  to  their  prevailing  ethical  standards.  This  is  source  of 
conflict since trade organizations have ruled these ethical standards to be barriers to free 
trade. In order to have an effective ethical control mechanism through consumer ethical 
preferences, consumers need to have access to information regarding product attributes 
they deem to be relevant to their consumption choices. Once again, this is a source of 
conflict since trade organizations have ruled even the provision of information to be a 
barrier to trade when it cannot be proven to be related to product safety or quality (e.g., 
labeling of GMO’s in products, labeling of dolphin-safe tuna, labeling of animal welfare 
standards) even when there is clear evidence that consumers value that information. 
In  the  past,  trade  organizations  have  resolved  this  conflict  using  one-sided 
policies/rulings that give credence to eliminating barriers while giving no weight to ethics 
or consumer sovereignty. What should be done instead is a judicious balancing of free 
trade concerns versus the other conflicting values (as trade organizations in theory do on 
other issues such as safety). How this balancing should take place will be split into the 
two control mechanisms described above. 
Balancing issues involving consumer ethical preferences/provision of information 
When it comes to allowing consumers in a nation to express their own ethical preferences 
in the market place, there does not seem to be any valid economic argument against 
allowing  this to  take  place.  Since  consumers are  allowed  to  freely  choose  what  they 
consume in the market, the issue comes down to the provision of information. In other 
words, are mandatory, or even voluntary, labels a barrier to trade. Trade organizations 
have  taken  surprisingly  strong  stands  against  providing  consumers  information  that 
consumers  clearly  find  relevant  (such  as  labeling  GMO  foods,  milk  with  growth 
hormones, etc.). 
Generally, economists favor markets that maximize the information provided to agents. 
In fact, the welfare arguments for free and open markets both domestically and globally 
are strongly linked to an assumption that agents function with perfect information. The 
only counterargument to labeling is really one of consumer ignorance and irrationality, 
where providing more information to consumers will supposedly cause them to behave 
irrationally. For example, the debate regarding GM food labeling focused on whether 
food  safety  concerns  were  scientifically  legitimate  (Scandizzo,  2002).  If  the  safety 
concerns  were  not  valid,  the  argument  was  that  consumers  would  use  the  label  to 
“irrationally”  decrease  their  consumption  of  these  foods.  Studies  have  found  that  the 
majority of the American public was found to be opposed to the use of both rGBH and International Conference on Globalization and Its Discontents, Cortland, 2007 
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GM foods (Buttel, 2000 and Giannakas and Fulton, 2002). Therefore, the failure to label 
these facts goes against the concept of consumer sovereignty and assumes that consumers 
will act ignorantly against their own interests. Interestingly, the public is largely ignorant 
of the extent of the technology’s prevalence, with only 43% of people in recent surveys 
even  knowing  that  genetically  modified  food  was  available  in  U.S.  supermarkets 
(Scandizzo, 2002). 
A  conclusion  that  consumers  are  acting  ignorantly  simply  indicates  that  a  group  of 
institutionally defined “experts” disagree with the opinions of consumers. Experts can be 
wrong, both due to human error and due to the influence and interests of the institutions 
that support them. Furthermore, the consensus of experts in different countries on topics 
such  as  GM  foods  can  differ  substantially.  Consumers  have  a  right  to  disbelieve  a 
particular  panel  of  experts.  They  also  have  a  right  to  extend  a  greater  precautionary 
principle on safety issues when it comes to their own safety or other issues. While a case 
could  be  made  for  providing  consumers  with  more  accessible  information  on  what 
experts have to say, there is very little economically valid basis for keeping consumers 
ignorant of facts they believe to be relevant. The idea that consumers are so irrationally 
that we  must  keep important (to them) facts about food out of their hands also runs 
strongly counter to the entire argument for free trade in the first place. If consumers are 
this irrational, then any economic argument that reducing trade barriers unequivocally 
raises welfare has no theoretical validity. 
There is some evidence that information overload can be a problem. For example Jacoby 
et al (1974a & 1974b) found that agents can make worse decisions if they get too much 
information. However an experiment by Grether and Wilde (1983) do not find this to be 
true. If information overload is a serious consideration, then this suggests that we should 
be scientific and thoughtful in how information is provided; it is not a valid argument for 
leaving consumers uninformed regarding issues they find relevant. 
In conclusion, regarding labeling and provision of information, the consumer sovereignty 
argument  is  overwhelming.  There  appears  to  be  no  valid  counterargument  why 
consumers  should  not  be  allowed  to  choose  based  on  any  information  they  deem 
valuable. While it is important to minimize the potential for misleading the public with 
labels and other information sources, the way to do this should be to expand information 
provision rather than to restrict it. Rather than being a barrier to free trade, providing 
consumers  with  relevant  information  is  consistent  with  free  trade—in  fact  it  is  the 
definition of free trade. The provision of information valued by consumers should be 
allowed as a matter of general principle. Rather than information provision being a trade 
barrier, the prohibition of information provision is in fact a trade barrier. 
Balancing issues involving ethics-based regulations 
For national laws and regulations, the answer is not as clear cut as it is for information 
considerations. Some judicial process must balance legitimacy of ethical considerations 
against de facto trade barriers. This should be done through a set of guidelines to aid in 
the balancing act. Among the factors that should be included in the judicial balancing act International Conference on Globalization and Its Discontents, Cortland, 2007 
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are: (1) Evidence of a strong ethical norm, (2) Scope of ethical norm, (3) Depth of belief 
in ethical norm, (4) Specificity of norm, (5) De facto barrier impact, and (6) Presumption 
of national sovereignty in ethical standards. 
Evidence  of a  strong  ethical  norm:  Generally,  the  stronger an  ethical  norm is for  a 
nation, the more weight it should be given relative to the competing consideration of free 
trade. A number of sub-factors go into defining the strength of an ethical norm. One is the 
history of that ethical norm. Has it been existing or evolving in society for a considerable 
length of time (such as growing concern about child labor laws in the last century)? Does 
it show consistency over time? Evidence of strong advocacy groups is a sub-factor that 
suggests a strong ethical norm. Strong advocacy groups are a sign that public concern 
over an issue is legitimate. Furthermore, when these advocates are largely independent of 
those with interests in restricting trade, this lends further credence to the concern. For 
example, if labor organizations whose  members are likely to benefit financially from 
restricting trade are the dominant advocates of a restrictive rule, then this is less credible 
than advocacy by a party that has no other interest in the outcome of trade (such as an 
animal advocacy group trying to prohibit imports of dog and cat fur). An additional sub-
factor  relating  to  evidence  of  a  strong  ethical  norm  is  the  presence  of  evidence  of 
evolution toward norm in internal law. If a nation seeks to prohibit imports of products of 
a certain type, if the ethical concern is genuine (rather than merely an excuse to restrict 
trade) there is likely to be internal laws at a national or local level preventing a practice 
that grow in strength and prevalence over time. A final sub-factor suggesting a strong 
ethical norm is evidence of internal sacrifice to meet norm. In other words, if firms within 
a country suffered significant costs to meet a standard and then that standard is extended 
externally, or both internal and external firms would suffer from the restriction if it is 
added simultaneously, this is more credible than if primarily foreign firms would suffer 
from  a  rule  being  put  in  place,  and  domestic  firms  would  have  used  an  alternative 
production process anyway. 
Scope of ethical norm: An ethical norm that is widely held within a country is more 
credible as the basis for a law than one which is based on a value that is only held by a 
small group. 
Depth of belief in ethical norm: An ethical norm that is deep-rooted and central to the 
belief system of many people in a nation is more credible as a basis for a law than one 
which is of minor concern. 
Specificity of norm: A rule that is closely tied with the production process of a good or 
service is more credible than one that is more general. For example, a regulation that is 
about the general practices of a country such as boycotting all products in South Africa 
when apartheid was in practice may have an ethical basis but it is also quite clearly an 
intentional barrier to trade.  On the other hand, a prohibition that is limited in scope to a 
specific  production  process  or  labor  practice  is  more  tightly  defined,  and  can  be 
consistent with free trade in general. 
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De facto barrier impact: The impact of a regulation on trade is also an important factor 
to  weigh.  This  involves  several  sub-factors.  The  first  sub-factor  is  how  much  of 
international competition is excluded? Rules that have less impact on the quantity of 
international  trade  are  less  of  a  de  facto  barrier.  A  second  sub-factor  is  which 
international  competition  is  excluded.  Does  the  rule  cut  out  imports  from  all  of 
developing world for example while leaving developed countries unaffected, or does the 
impact cut across categories? A final sub-factor here is whether international competition 
can reasonably adjust to meet new standard. 
Presumption of national sovereignty in ethical standards: One of the most important 
principals here is that the burden of proof is on those seeking to stop implementation of 
an ethical standard. There is a presumption of national sovereignty, and unless the trade 
barrier impact is clearly stronger than the ethical basis for a rule, then the rule should be 
allowed.  This  is  just  the  opposite  tendency  from  that  currently  practiced  by  trade 
organization, which have a strong presumption against any national laws or practices that 
impact trade in any way. The impact as a de facto trade barrier should clearly outweigh 
its importance as a legitimate ethical standard for an international body to step in and 
overrule the presumption of national sovereignty. There are many legal principals parallel 
to this logic, but one similar practice in US courts in criminal trials is judges weighing the 
prejudicial value of evidence being possibly presented against its probative value when 
considering whether to exclude evidence. Evidence is generally allowed in unless the 
prejudicial value clearly outweighs its probative value. 
Furthermore, even if a practice creates a temporary barrier to trade, this is not an adequate 
basis  to  prevent  a  law  if  producers  can  reasonably  be  expected  to  adjust.  Producer 
adjustment while maintaining competitive balance must be unreasonable to expect for a 
trade organization to act to prevent a nation from establishing a law based on genuine 
ethical standards. Also, the consumer sovereignty principle should be held to overrule 
expert  opinion.  In  other  words,  consumer  beliefs  are  taken  seriously  in  determining 
whether a law is appropriate, regardless of whether a majority of experts disagree. 
Conclusion 
This discussion has argued that ethical factors matter to consumers, even if they only 
affect the production process and not the tangible characteristics of the final product. 
Trade organizations have often acted to prevent nations from establishing certain ethical 
rules  for  products  sold  within  their  borders,  and  have  even  discouraged  the  flow  of 
information rather than encouraged it. From an economic perspective it seems quite clear 
that public policy on this issue should push for the full provision of relevant information 
to  consumers,  and  it  is  difficult  to  think  of  a  case  where  requiring  information  can 
legitimately be considered a real barrier to trade. On the other hand, laws that seek to 
outright prohibit a practice require judicious review, balancing the ethical issues and the 
trade  impact.  A  number  of  factors  to  consider  have  been  provided  here,  but  the 
presumption should go in favor of national sovereignty. A very strong case that a law 
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primarily creates a barrier to trade and that this outweighs any ethical value should need 
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